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Abstract 
The Cuban government has implemented a series of agricultural transformations since 2007 
to increase the country’s agricultural self-sufficiency and reduce its dependency on food 
imports. These include the transfer (in usufruct) of State-owned land to non-State producers 
(e.g. cooperatives and private farmers), moderate price reforms, the decentralization of 
decision making, and the gradual relaxation of existing forms of agricultural 
commercialization.  As a result of these measures, the area planted, as well as physical 
output and agricultural yields (in selected non-sugar crop categories) have shown mixed 
results, but still remain below desired levels. There are three (3) fundamental unresolved 
aspects that have prevented Cuba’s agricultural sector from achieving the desired outcomes: 
(1) the need to achieve the “realization of property,” (2) the recognition and acceptance of the 
market as a complementary economic coordination mechanism, and (3) the absence of a 
systemic focus to achieve the successful completion of the agricultural production cycle.  
These unresolved aspects should be addressed through: (1) the consolidation of input markets, 
where producers can obtain essential inputs at prices that correspond to the prices they can 
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obtain for their output, (2) greater autonomy to allow agricultural producers to freely decide 
when, where, and to whom they could sell their output, after social contracts have been 
fulfilled, (3) the diversification of the forms of agricultural commercialization to permit 
greater participation by non-State economic actors, (4) allowing agricultural producers to 
freely hire the labor necessary to sustain and increase production, and (5) providing 
agricultural producers with the financing and technical assistance necessary. 
Keywords: Agricultural transformations, Cuba, Cuban agriculture. 
JEL Classifications: P15, P20, Q15, Q18. 
1. Introduction 
In its recent efforts to transform (or “update”) its economic model, Cuba has understandably 
focused on its agricultural sector.  Even though it only accounts for approximately 5% of 
gross domestic product (GDP), agriculture represents a relatively large share of the Cuban 
economy (some 20%) due to its direct linkages with other sectors and multiplier effect (Nova 
González, 2006, 2013a, 2013b).  Despite of the expansion of tourism and services, Cuba 
still remains an agricultural country, and agriculture touches every aspect of the country’s 
economic and social life. 
The agricultural sector plays an important role in the Cuban economy due to various factors.  
First, an important group of industries or sectors, such as sugar (including derivative 
products), food, tobacco and beverages, which account for approximately 6.5% of the 
country’s GDP, depend heavily on the raw materials or inputs supplied by the agricultural 
sector.   Second, related activities, such as the transportation and commercialization of 
agricultural products, and food processing, which account for about 10% of GDP, are also 
dependent on the agricultural sector (Nova González, 2008).  In total, close to 20% of 
Cuba’s GDP is directly or indirectly related to the agricultural sector (Nova González, 
2013b). 
Cuba’s agricultural sector also plays an important role as a source of employment; 
approximately 21% of the country’s economically active population works in agriculture.  If 
related activities, such the transportation, storage, and commercialization of agricultural 
products, are included, the agricultural sector’s share of total employment increases 
significantly (Nova González, 2014).  Close to 4 million Cubans, or 80% of the labor force, 
is either directly or indirectly related to agriculture (in terms of employment and economic 
activities) (Nova González, 2008). 
The agricultural sector also plays an important role as a supplier of renewable energy (Nova 
González, 2008).   This is primarily accomplished through generation of electricity, biofuels, 
and biogas produced by the sugar agro-industry.  Sugarcane plantations can absorb carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and emit oxygen (O2).  It is estimated that over the course of one year a 
hectare planted with sugarcane can absorb about 60 tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) and emit 
approximately 40 tons of oxygen (O2), resulting in the so-called “forest effect” (Nova 
González, 2008). 
Finally, as a consumer of raw materials, intermediate capital goods, and finished products, 
Cuba’s agricultural sector has strong linkages with almost every sector of the economy.  
These linkages, and high levels of coordination and integration, contribute to the 
aforementioned multiplier effect (of the agricultural sector) and to its positive spillovers, 
magnifying the economic and strategic importance of agriculture in the Cuban economy. 
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Since the collapse of the Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, Cuba’s agricultural sector has been affected by declining output levels, low labor 
productivity, worker absenteeism, insufficient administrative coordination, excessive 
bureaucratic controls, and  increasing de-capitalization caused by shortages of investment 
and foreign exchange receipts (Hagelberg, 2010; Spadoni, 2014).   Cuban agriculture has 
also been impacted by adverse weather conditions, particularly several devastating hurricanes 
and a severe drought (2006-2008) and the effects of the U.S. trade embargo (González-Corzo, 
Mesa-Lago, 2012; 2013; Nova González, 2013; Spadoni, 2014). 
After Raul Castro’s official ascent to power on February 24, 2008, a series of policy measures 
have been implemented to prioritize and reactivate this vital sector of the Cuban economy.  
The most significant include:  the approval of Decree Law No. 259 in 2008, which 
facilitates the transfers of idle State-owned lands to private producers and agricultural 
cooperatives, the transfer of some of the functions performed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MINAGRI) to the Ministry of Interior Trade (MINCIN), the creation of a limited number of 
State-operated establishments to sell basic agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizer, work 
gloves, machetes, axes, etc.) to small agricultural producers, experiments with “suburban 
agriculture” to connect local producers and consumers and reduce fuel, transportation and 
storage costs, and increases in the prices paid by Acopio, the State-run agricultural 
procurement agency, to private farmers and cooperatives producing milk, beans, rice, and 
other products. 
This paper analyzes Cuba’s agricultural transformations since the process of “updating” its 
socialist economic model was initiated in 2007.  The first section presents a detailed account 
of the principal agricultural reform measures implemented from the inception of the 
“economic updating” process.  This is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the structure 
and performance of Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector, with a particular emphasis on key 
metrics such as planted areas and areas under production, physical output, and agricultural 
yields.  Finally, the last section explores the principal elements of Cuba’s emerging 
agricultural model and its prospects for the future. 
2. Agricultural Transformations (2007 – Present) 
Falling agricultural output, low yields, declining labor productivity, high levels of waste and 
inefficiency, the rising costs of food imports, and the deterioration of the trade balance, have 
placed food production at the forefront of the economic challenges confronting Cuba at the 
present time (Hagelberg, 2010).  According to official statistics, Cuba spent $2.0 billion on 
imported food and agricultural products in 2013, representing 13.6% of the country’s total 
merchandise imports for that year (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, 2014 ).  
As it experienced the worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Eastern European 
Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and confronted 
with a more favorable international environment, mainly as the result of its close economic 
ties with Venezuela, China, and Canada, and its extended diplomatic relations with virtually 
every country in the Western Hemisphere and other regions of the world, Cuba has 
implemented a series of policy measures to transform its agricultural sector.   
One of the first steps taken in this direction consisted of paying higher prices to producers of 
certain agricultural products.  This process was initiated in 2007, when the State 
procurement agency, Acopio, increased the prices it paid milk producers as well as the 
percentage paid in convertible pesos (CUC) per liter produced and delivered. In 2007, the 
State increased the prices that its procurement agency, Acopio, paid to agricultural producers 
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for a selected group of products. Rice prices, for example, increased from 1,931 Cuban pesos 
(CUP) per ton in 2007 to 6,304 CUP by the end of 2013 (Spadoni, 2014). Similarly, the price 
paid by Acopio to agricultural producers for potatoes rose from 544 pesos per ton to 652 
pesos per ton between 2007 and 2013 (Spadoni, 2014); and the prices paid to milk and beef 
producers increased from 900 pesos per ton to 5,218 pesos per ton, and from 2,450 pesos per 
ton to 8,900 pesos per ton, respectively, during the same period (Spadoni, 2014). Higher 
prices have incentivized agricultural producers to improved their output deliveries (or sales) 
to Acopio, resulting in notable fuel savings and improved distribution to the State-operated 
retail store network (Nova González, 2010). 
The resulting increase in producers’ incomes resulting from this measure increased 
producers’ capacity to obtain essential inputs to further increase production. (Nova González, 
2010).  These price increases allowed Acopio to recover a part of this production, which 
previously had other destinations and producers have been encouraged to sell their product to 
Acopio. This measure constitutes a direct stimulus to producers, and incentivizes them to 
indirectly contribute to certain savings in fuel and loss reductions because of timely deliveries 
made to Acopio. This procedure has been implemented in 89 municipalities, of which 66 are 
fully self-sufficient. However, it has resulted in certain unintended consequences, which have 
contributed to reductions in deliveries to industry, resulting in the under-utilization of the 
country’s industrial capacity (Nova González, 2010) 
Acopio also increased the prices it pays to meat and poultry producers.  Payments in 
convertible pesos (CUC) to meat and poultry producers have increased their purchasing 
power, allowing many of them to obtain essential agricultural inputs in recently-created hard 
currency stores for this purpose (there are stores in 70 of the 168 existing municipalities). 
Unfortunately, these stores tend to offer a limited variety of inputs of about 64 products, 
supply has been unpredictable and unreliable, and prices tend to be relatively high. 
The second significant policy measure implemented to transform Cuba’s non-sugar 
agricultural sector was the transfer of idle State-owned land to cooperatives and individual 
producers after the approval of Decree-Law 259 in July 2008. The implementation of this 
measure is somewhat  paradoxical since there is a significant amount of idle lands (1,758, 
962 hectares), a valuable human capital, a significant number of research centers and 
experimental stations, with proven results, and available technology, but since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Socialist Camp in the early 1990s, the Cuban 
economy has been forced to import significant volumes of food, many of which can be 
produced domestically under more favorable conditions.  
Decree-Law 259 clarifies important aspects of Cuba’s most recent “agrarian reform,” the 
conditions of usufruct under which idle State-owned lands will be transferred to cooperatives 
and individual producers, the terms of economic ownership related to this property form, and 
its relation to legal ownership (Nova González, 2010). It also helps to clarify important 
aspects, which until recently, remained unclear or undefined such as the period of time for 
which the usufruct is established, which helps define its economic ownership and legal 
ownership, and the collection of taxes and rents by the State. 
In addition, the Decree-Law 259 incorporates some elements that were not taken into 
consideration in previous agricultural reform measures, such as the duration of transfers to 
natural persons (10 years, renewable leases, regardless of the type of crop harvested), and the 
transfers of land to legal entities such as cooperatives (Nova González, 2010).  One 
interesting feature that distinguishes Decree Law 259 from previous legislation is that the 
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terms of the usufruct, or lease agreements, are standardized for specific periods regardless of 
the types of crops produced, the modes of production used to generate this output, and 
whether or not the crops are considered short-cycle or long-cycle, and the type of livestock 
raised by producers (Nova González, 2010). 
The degree of investment intensity related to agricultural production varies according to the 
type of crop produced, or the type of livestock raised.  Some products and forms of livestock 
are more labor and capital intensive than others, and due to their seasonal nature require 
different quantities of labor and physical and financial capital Pursuant to Article 15 (of 
Decree Law 259), once finalized, the terms of the usufruct  allow producers to receive 
payment or compensation from the State for  bienhechurias, or infrastructure or physical 
improvements to the land and facilities used for production, with the exception of housing 
built by individual producers or cooperatives. This constraint or limit provides a distorted 
incentive to make the minimum investment required, prevents the agricultural producers 
permanently settling in their newly acquired lands (leased from the State), and explains why 
most of them despite the positive advances made by Decree Law 259, consider themselves as 
transient (non-permanent) producers. In reality, as Nova González (2009, 2010) indicates, the 
successful transformation of Cuba’s agricultural sector requires the recampesinización, or the 
re-population of the countryside; without significant and long-lasting increases in the quantity 
of farmers, technicians, and administrative and managerial personnel dedicated to agriculture, 
there is no guarantee and stability of a sustainable agricultural production (Nova González, 
2009, 2010). 
Cuba’s newly decentralized agricultural model must recognize that agricultural producers 
require certain facilities to store and preserve the essential inputs, animals, seeds, supplies, 
and equipment, among others.  To stimulate the migration of labor from other areas of the 
economy into agriculture, policies that provide economic incentives for investment in 
physical infrastructure and promote long-term commitments to agriculture are being 
contemplated. To ensure the success of this decentralized model of agricultural production, 
where regional and local producers are expected to develop strong linkages with the land in 
which they work, and consumers and suppliers in their respective “markets,” producers and 
administrative and managerial personnel need to live near or on the locations where 
production takes, a sense of permanence and consistency must be encouraged and developed, 
and the linkages between producers and the lands in which production takes place must be 
strengthened over time (Nova González, 2010).  
By the end of 2009, some 920,000 hectares of idle State-owned lands had been transferred to 
more than 100,000 applicants, representing 52% of the total (Nova González, 2010). Until 
January 2010, there had been 121,711 applications, of which 98% are natural persons, of 
which approximately 79% were previously landless (Nova González, 2010). At the present 
time, it is estimated that 35% of the land delivered has been planted or cultivated (Nova 
González, 2010).  Considering the original conditions of the majority of this land, and the 
wide range of challenges, constraints, and difficulties that non-State agricultural producers 
still face, this is indeed a remarkable accomplishment.  
Yet, despite the notable increases in the number of applications from both cooperatives and 
individual producers, the transfer of idle State-owned lands to non-State producers has been 
characterized by a series of bureaucratic hurdles and impediments, which still present serious 
difficulties.  According to the provisions of Decree Law 282, nine (9) documents are 
required for processing of application for the transfer of land in usufruct (Nova González, 
2010).  To file a complaint or appeal, applicants are required to complete and submit 
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thirteen (13) documents, and from the time the applicant files the application for the transfer 
of land with the municipal director of the Centro Nacional del Control de la Tierra (National 
Center for  Land Control), the office has thirty (30) days to review the application, and draft 
or prepare the required documentation, and up to sixty (60) days to conduct the necessary 
surveys and medical examinations of the livestock to be transferred from State ownership to 
the non-State sector (Nova González, 2010).Once the necessary documents are drawn, the 
municipal director of the National Center for Land Control presents them to the municipal 
delegate of agriculture in the term of three (3) days, and the latter has  thirty (30) days to 
review and approval of grant of the requested transfer in usufruct or requested (Nova 
González, 2010).  
Theoretically, it can take at least sixty-three (63) days, from the beginning of the application 
to lease idle lands or livestock from the State for a predetermined period of time, under the 
conditions previously described, until the formal documents are approved and issued, 
assuming that process transpires normally and does not require additional field surveys or 
measurements, and other bureaucratic steps or procedures.  In such cases, the time needed to 
clear existing bureaucratic  hurdles and effectively transfer the land or livestock from the 
State to the cooperative or private sectors can theoretically take ninety-three (93) days or 
even longer. 
Another important measure in Cuba’s road towards a more flexible and decentralized 
agricultural model was the transfer of the collection activities, assigned to the State-owned 
procurement agency, Acopio, to the Ministry of Domestic Trade (Ministerio del Comercio 
Interior, MINCIN).  For many experts in Cuban agriculture, this is considered as a road 
already traveled. In 1976, procurement was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Ministerio de la Agricultura, MINAGRI), but then returned to it after the “Rectification 
Process” (RP) in 1986.  Transferring Acopio’s functions to the MINAGRI would be a more 
logical and appropriate step to improve the operational and administrative efficiency of 
Cuba’s cumbersome system of agricultural procurement (Nova González, 2010). 
At the present time, Cuba’s agricultural procurement and marketing system is hindered by a 
highly regulated market, the distortions related to monetary dualism, and insufficient output, 
particularly by the cooperative sector (which includes the Unidades Básicas de Producción 
Cooperativa, UBPCs, and the Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria, CPAs).   Despite 
recent efforts, the marketing function, which includes the distribution and exchange of 
agricultural products, is characterized by delayed payments, insufficient collection capacity 
on the part of Acopio, and the lack of material incentives and credit financing to stimulate and 
incentivize production (Nova González, 2010).  
Another key measure in the transformation of Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector has been 
the decentralization and the restructuring of the functions of the ministries responsible for the 
administration, implementation, and oversight of the country’s agricultural policies. The 
municipality as an increasingly autonomous economic unit is as the center of this new 
strategy.  The newly-considered model of decentralized decision making identifies the 
municipality as the principal actor responsible for making rational economic decisions and 
implementing the required strategies within its territorial boundaries.  At the present time, 
each municipality has established a Municipal Delegation of agriculture (169 in total), which 
is primarily responsible for managing the transfers of idle State-owned lands and State-owned 
livestock to the non-State sector, to promote and stimulate the development of three (3) 
“core” modalities of production: (1)  urban agriculture, (2) suburban agriculture, which 
covers a span of about  10 km from the periphery of cities and urban centers, and (3) and 
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productive or conventional poles (Nova González, 2010). During the testing phase of this 
model in 2010, the MINAG selected 16 municipalities plus the special municipality of Isla de 
la Juventud, a total of 17, to carry across the combination of these three scenarios. 
Participation was extended to all the entities that produce food in the municipality, whether or 
not under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (UBPCs, CCS, CPAs, State-owned 
farms, etc.) (Nova González, 2010). 
In addition, the Ministry of the Economy and Planning (MEP) has also selected five (5) 
municipalities that are supporting financially and decentralized forms of economic 
management, for investigation on solutions on the substitution of imports, export generated 
funds, on the food and employment problem (Nova González, 2010).  The MEP also 
implemented a series of internal reforms to simply the State apparatus and structures that deal 
or are in some ways related with the production, distribution, and consumption of agricultural 
products.   The first step in this direction was the unification of the Ministry of the Food 
Industry (Ministerio de la Industria Alimenticia, MINAL) with the former Ministry of 
Fisheries after the approval of Decree-Law 287 and Decree-Law 294 in 2011.    
Decree-287 also transferred some of the functions of the Sugar Ministry (MINAZ) to the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) and to the Ministry of the Economy and Planning (MEP). 
MINAG was assigned regulatory and supervisory functions such as managing land dedicated 
to sugar production, enforcing industrial and environmental regulations, and overseeing the 
commercialization of refined sugar and sugar derivatives. The MEP is now responsible for 
managing State investments in the sugar sector, and the Ministry of Trade and Foreign 
Investment (MINCEX) is responsible for implementing export policies and managing foreign 
investment in agriculture.Decree-law 294 replaced the Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ) with a 
holding company, Grupo Azucarero AZCUBA, responsible for managing all economic and 
investment activities relates to the sugar Agro-Industry. AZCUBA is a diversified holding 
company, comprised of twenty-five specialized subsidiaries, organized to manage sugar 
production and exports. 
The approval of Agreement 6853 on June 24, 2010 represented another important step in the 
transformation of Cuba’s non-sugar agriculture sector.  This policy measure authorizes the 
commercialization (or trade) of agricultural products in roadside kiosks (or “points of sale”) 
operated by agricultural cooperatives or state enterprises.  Producers or their representatives 
are authorized to sell their excess output, after their quotas to the state have been delivered 
(or met) (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba, 2010).  Agricultural producers or their representatives are 
required to pay taxes and/or fees for the use of these kiosks (or “points of sale) as stipulated 
by Resolution 206 issued by the Ministry of Prices and Finance.  According to Resolution 
206, sellers in the kiosks (or “points of sale”) established by Agreement 6853 are required to 
pay a sales tax of 5%, based on their daily gross sales, plus a fee of 2% of the value of their 
reported gross sales for the use of the kiosks and related facilities, and self-employed workers 
(who work on these kiosks) are required to make social security contributions 
(González-Corzo, 2013) 
The approval of Agreement 6853 (2010) represents a step in the right direction.  However, 
certain provisions limit its potential.  First, the entities or administrative units that 
administer the kiosks (or “points of sale”) are a State-owned entity, which implies that the 
State will continue to play a significant role in the administration of the important sales 
venues.  Second, producers that use these venues to commercialize their agricultural 
products must first fulfill their delivery quotas to the State at prices and amounts established 
by the latter.  These conditions limit the autonomy of participants in the kiosks (or “points 
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of sale”) in terms of determining output prices and quantity, and are likely to contribute to 
imbalances between supply and demand. 
 
The decentralization of Cuban agriculture was further expanded with the approval of 
Resolution 90 by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Resolution 122 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MINAG), Resolution 369 by the Ministry of Finance and Prices, and Resolution 
121 by the Ministry of Tourism (MINTOUR) in 2011. These policy measures facilitated the 
decentralized commercialization of a selected group of agricultural products and Tourism 
Enterprises; authorized non-state producers such as cooperatives and private farmers to sell 
part of their output directly to such enterprises; and created a new entity, FINTOUR, S.A., to 
provide credit financing to tourism enterprises engaged in direct commercialization with 
participating agricultural producers (González-Corzo, 2013). 
The approval of Decree-law 289 and Resolution 99 in 2011 formalized the extension of 
agricultural credits (from state-owned Banks) to non-state agricultural producers, 
representing another step towards a more flexible agricultural model. Decree 289 establishes 
the legal framework for the provision of agricultural credits to non-state production units, 
including self-employed workers, as well as for individuals wishing to obtain credit finance 
for home improvements and repairs. Decree-law 289 allows self-employed workers and 
private farmers earning more than 50,000 pesos (CUP) to open a business account; it also 
lifted existing ceiling of 3,000 pesos (CUP) on bank loans to natural persons, and eliminated 
the 100 convertible peso (CUC) limits on payments by State Owned Enterprises (SOES) to 
self-employed workers, who provided goods and services to SOES, on a contractual basis 
(González-Corzo, 2013). 
Resolution 99, approved by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) in November 2011, authorized 
the extension of bank-based credit financing (up to 500 pesos-cup) to non-state agricultural 
producers (e.g. cooperatives and private farmers). Resolution 99 allows non-state agricultural 
producers to obtain credit financing to purchase and repair equipment, procure inventory, and 
obtain other essential inputs, including the costs of replanting and reconditioning 
previously-planted fields (González-Corzo, 2013). Depending on the borrower’s 
circumstances and the nature (or purpose) of the loan, it can be amortized using any source of 
income, for periods of 18 to 60 months (González-Corzo, 2013). 
The economic transformation of Cuba’s agricultural sector was accelerated after the 
ratification of the “Guidelines” (“Lineamientos de la Política del Partido y la Revolución”) 
after the 6
th
 party Congress of the Communist Party (PPC) on April, 2011. As Nova González 
(2013) indicates, Cuba’s Agricultural Sector confronts three (3) principal unresolved issues: 
(1) the need to achieve the “Realization of Property,”
1
 the need to recognize (and accept) the 
existence and role of the market, and the inexistence of a systemic strategy through the 
productive cycle that would reflect its complex microeconomic and macroeconomic 
interrelations. 
Several policies responses have been recommended and discussed to address or resolve these 
issues. These include: (1) the creation and development of input markets where agricultural 
producers can obtain essential inputs and supplies, (2) granting greater autonomy to 
agricultural producers, allowing them to decide how much output to produce, where to sell it 
                                                        
1 The concept of the “realization of property” refers to the right of producers to have complete autonomy in determining 
output levels, choosing the final destination of their output, and determining its price; and having the ability to directly 
access input markets to obtain the essential inputs to close the productive cycle (Nova González, 2013). 
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and whom to sell it to, based on market conditions and social requirements, (3) facilitating 
diverse forms of agricultural commercialization as an alternative to the State monopoly, (4) 
allowing agricultural producers to freely hire labor, and (5) providing new and existing 
agricultural producers with adequate financial and technical  support (Nova González, 2013). 
The Guidelines offer several proposals to address the aforementioned unresolved issues 
confronted by Cuba’s agricultural sector. With regards to the creation of input markets where 
agricultural producers will be able to obtain essential inputs, the “Guidelines” indicate that 
such wholesale markets will be able to purchase  or lease equipment, machinery, and other 
essential inputs, with the objective of increasing producer autonomy, limiting State 
intervention, and recognizing the participation of non-state forms of production (Nova 
González, 2013). 
With regards to prices, the “Guidelines” explicitly state that the State will retain full 
discretion over price regulations, and prices will be established according to the plan (i.e. 
prices will be centrally-determined), taking into account the social and economic functions of 
the products and services for which prices will be centrally-determined by the State (Nova 
González, 2013). At the same time, mechanisms that allow the creation other prices by the 
Enterprise Sector will be approved, taking into account the interests of the nation, rather than 
those of the enterprise, as well as sectoral and territorial considerations (Nova González, 
2013). The Guidelines state that prices will be centrally-established in accordance with efforts 
to “update” the country’s economic model (Nova González, 2013).  
The Guidelines contain several contradictory provisions that hinder the development of a 
more flexible system for the commercialization of agricultural products. Article 27, under 
“Economic Procurement Model,” states that surplus agricultural production (i.e. production 
above the State established quotas) cannot be sold directly to the population through 
intermediaries; this provision hinders producer autonomy and limits their ability to achieve 
“The Realization of Property” (Nova González, 2013). Conversely, Article 183 proposes the 
transformation of the system of agricultural commercialization by simplifying the supply 
chain between producers and consumers, including the possibility of allowing  producers to 
reach consumers through their own means (or resources) (i.e. via direct sales or 
commercialization) (Nova González, 2013). Along similar lines, Article 304 aims to 
restructure retail and wholesale agricultural commerce through more flexible arrangements in 
order to simplify the linkages between producers and consumers, taking into account 
economic conditions and the diversification of production and property forms (Nova 
González, 2013). 
The Guidelines also provide for greater producer autonomy with regards to hiring labour by 
considering the expansion of employment in the non-state sector, as an alternative modality 
closely aligned with emerging production and property forms. In that respect, the Guidelines 
are closely synchronized with Resolution 32 and Resolution 33 of the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security (MTSS), which authorized a new form of self-employed agricultural worker 
and regulate labor hiring practices by cooperatives and self-employed workers (Nova 
González, 2013). 
Finally, with regards to providing new and existing agricultural producers with adequate 
financial support and training, Article 50 of the Guidelines identifies the implementation of 
policies to support those activities that stimulate national production and the provision of 
bank loans (or credit) to facilitate the expansion of the non-state sector as its principal goals 
(Nova González, 2013). Other policy objectives include applying a differentiated tax regime  
to stimulate agricultural production, the expansion of insurance programs to cover 
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agricultural producers, and the development of specialized banking and financial services to 
meet their needs, including non-state producers who received land in usufruct after the 
approval of  Decree-law 259 in 2008 (Nova González, 2013). 
The approval of Decree-Law 300 on October 2012 expanded the principal provisions of 
Decree-Law 259 (2008) with regards to the transfers of idle State-owned lands to non-State 
producers (e.g., cooperatives and private farmers) in usufruct.  Decree-Law 300 expanded 
the maximum number of hectares that could be transferred to non-State producers (in 
usufruct) to 67.1; it also permitted individual (or private) agricultural producers operating 
under this new modality to become affiliated with cooperatives other than the Credit and 
Services Cooperatives (CCS).  Under Decree-Law 300 (2012), private farmers can also 
associate themselves with Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) or Basic Units of 
Cooperative Production (UBPCs); in addition, they are allowed to use alternative channels to 
procure essential inputs and distribute their output, once delivery quotas with the State have 
been fulfilled (González-Corzo, 2012). 
In 2013, the Cuban government introduced several regulatory updates to further transform the 
agricultural sector.  These primarily consist of policy measures to expand the sales of 
agricultural products to tourism enterprises, facilitate the direct commercialization of 
agricultural products (on an experimental basis) in the provinces of Havana, Mayabeque, and 
Artemisa, and restructure the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG).  The approval of 
Resolution 58 by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Resolution 352 by the Ministry of 
Finance and Prices, and Resolution 37 by the Ministry of Tourism (MINTUR) on September 
2013 represent another step towards the transformation of the regulations governing the direct 
sales of agricultural products to tourism enterprises in Cuba.  These measures supplement 
Resolution 122, which was approved in 2011.  Their principal provisions include the 
authorization of direct sales of agricultural products in Cuban pesos (CUP) to tourism 
enterprises, without State intermediation, by all types of agricultural producers, including 
individual (private) farmers, and the expansion of authorized products to include: fresh cut 
flowers, gardening services, floral arrangements, dry spices, and eggs.  According to 
Resolution 9 (June 2013), prices can be directly determined by buyers and sellers. Resolution 
9 also establishes the implementation of a “transaction fee” of 9 Cuban pesos (CUP) for 
every convertible peso (CUC) generated from the direct sale of agricultural products to 
tourism enterprises (by ALL types of agricultural producers).  In accordance with 
Decree-Law 112 (2012), Casa Financiera, S.A. and other financial and banking institutions 
will collect a 5% (sales) tax payment from tourism enterprises.  
The approval of Decree-Law 318 and Resolution 673 by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) 
on October 2013 authorized the creation, on an experimental basis, of non-agricultural 
cooperatives in some of the previous locations of the Mercados Agropecuarios Estatales 
(MAEs) [State Agricultural Markets] in Havana, Artemisa, and Mayabeque provinces.  
Nationwide expansion is planned by 2015.   Their principal objective is to decentralize the 
commercialization of agricultural products by facilitating the creation of “mercados de 
abastos” (wholesale markets) where agricultural producers and or authorized intermediaries 
can offer their products at wholesale prices. The approval of Decree-Law 318 and Resolution 
673 represents the implementation of Lineamiento 181 (which basically proposed the 
calibration between supply and demand in agricultural markets), and Lineamiento 183 (which 
focused on steps to improve the commercialization of agricultural products).
2
  These 
                                                        
2 The term “Lineamientos” refers to the “Lineamientos de la PolíticaEconómica y Social del Partido y la Revolución” – or 
the “Social and Economic Guidelines of the Party and the Revolution” (commonly referred to as the “Guidelines”) – 
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measures are applicable to ALL types of agricultural producers in the State and Non-State 
sectors, including a new category of intermediary officially labeled as “carretilleros” (street 
cart vendors). The principal provisions of Decree-Law 318 and Resolution 673 include: 
 The creation of Provincial Administration Councils responsible for implementing, and 
overseeing policies, determining the location of retail outlets and zones of operation 
for the “carretilleros,” and regulating direct sales of agricultural products to Centers 
of Social Consumption such as hospitals, schools, daycare centers, dinning commons 
(comedores), etc. 
 Beef, fresh milk, coffee, selected honey products, tobacco, and cocoa are excluded.  
Potatoes are subject to “social consumption requirements” (defined by the State). 
 State producers (e.g., State farms, enterprises, etc.) are authorized to participate; the 
same applies to Non-State producers such as UBPCs, CPAs, CCSs, private farmers, 
and self-employed worker (a newly-authorized producer category). 
 Authorized agricultural products may be distributed in the following outlets: 
Mercados Agropecuarios Estatales (MAEs), Mercados de Oferta y Demanda (MOD), 
Mercados Arrendados (a newly-created outlet type leased by the State to Non-State 




 Retail prices will be set by the Ministry of Finance and Prices for fixed price products; 
producers that operate in MAEs that have been converted to non-agricultural 
cooperatives can set their own prices, but these must be approved by the Ministry of 
Finance and Prices. 
 As an initial part of the experiment, some MAEs will be converted into “mercados de 
abastos” – located in Havana City only- which would allow enterprises and other 
entities to buy agricultural products directly from State and Non-State producers.   
 Cooperatives that participate in these markets will be exempt from taxes for the first 
three months; self-employed workers can also participate, but will receive a different 
tax treatment (as part of the efforts to prioritized cooperatives, which are considered a 
superior, and more socialized, property form). 
The efforts to restructure the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) announced in early 2014 
represent another key element of Cuba’s agricultural transformations.  These efforts are 
divided into three (3) phases.  The first phase consists of updating the MINAG budget 
system.  Phase two considers the creation of Provincial Enterprises (Empresas Provinciales) 
and during phase three it is expected that the Provincial and Municipal Administrative 
Councils will be phased out. The following measures are also planned: (1) transferring 
Provincial Enterprises to Provincial Administration, (2), the consolidation of 15 existing 
Agricultural Research Stations with similar institutions in the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and the Environment (CITMA). 
3. Recent Performance (2007 - Present)    
                                                                                                                                                                            
approved by the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) on April 18, 2011.  The “Guidelines” are the 
framework that broadly delineates Cuba’s economic policies since the 6th Party Congress.    
3 The retail agricultural outlets operated by the Youth Work Army (EJT) are excluded from Decree-Law 318, and will 
continue to operate as in the past. 
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Table 1 presents the distribution of land in Cuba at the end of 2013. 
 
Table 1. Cuba: Land distribution based on tenure form, 2013 (thousand hectares) 









Total 10,988.4 5,932.1 5,056.3 1,952.0 614.3 2,490.0 
Agricultural Surface 6,342.4 1,851.7 4,490.7 1,677.5 521.5 2,291.7 
Cultivated (or harvested) Surface 2,645.8 471.8 2,174.0 851.3 264.9 1,057.8 
Non-agricultural Surface 4,646.0 4,080.4 565.5 274.5 92.8 198.3 
 
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014).  
As Table 1 indicates, Cuba’s arable land (or total agricultural surface) (6.3 million hectares 
[ha]), represented 57.7% of the country’s total land (10.9 million ha).  Approximately 41.7% 
of the arable land was harvested (or under cultivation) in 2013.  While the State sector holds 
54% of Cuba’s total land (5.9 million ha), only 29.2% of arable land is held by the State (1.9 
million ha), out of which 25.4% (472,000 ha) were harvested (or under cultivation) at the end 
of 2013 (Table 1). 
The non-State sector, which includes the Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades 
Básicas de Producción Cooperativa, UBPC), Cooperatives of Agricultural Production 
(Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria, CPA), Credit and Services Cooperatives 
(Cooperativas de Créditos y Servicios, CCS) and private farmers (privados), has seen its 
share of total land, arable land (or agricultural surface), and land under cultivation increase 
significantly since 2008 (Table 1).  At the end of 2013, 46% of Cuba’s total land (5 million 
ha), and 70.8% of the country’s arable land (4.5 million ha) were held by the non-State sector.  
Close to half (48.4%) of the arable land (2.2 million ha) held by the non-State sector were 
harvested (or under cultivation), representing 84.6% of the country’s area under cultivation 
(2.6 million ha) (Table 1). 
Table 2 shows the areas planted and under production for selected crops in Cuba’s non-sugar 
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Table 2. Cuba: Areas planted and under production, selected crops, hectares. 
CROPS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Chg. % Chg. 
Viandas
(a)
 279,752 352,452 363,041 295,844 271,957 297,326 17,574 6.3% 
Roots and tubers 196,122 246,033 243,834 200,993 190,725 228,507 32,385 16.5% 
Potato 9,789 12,480 8,671 7,365 6,375 4,941 -4,848 -49.5% 
Boniato 58,934 78,496 79,792 45,638 47,522 48,273 -10,661 -18.1% 
                  
Malanga 26,581 27,027 19,795 16,242 15,305 16,400 -10,181 -38.3% 
Plantains 83,630 106,419 119,207 94,851 81,232 68,819 -14,811 -17.7% 
Bananas 23,413 33,034 27,152 28,474 18,135 13,638 -9,775 -41.7% 
Plantains 60,217 73,385 92,055 66,377 63,097 55,181 -5,036 -8.4% 
Vegetables 259,073 278,561 236,569 211,610 202,897 214,026 -45,047 -17.4% 
Tomato 62,124 69,170 49,057 54,955 49,009 54,286 -7,838 -12.6% 
Onions 11,056 11,586 9,766 10,713 9,175 11,620 564 5.1% 
Pepper 6,969 7,227 5,797 5,618 6,311 7,825 856 12.3% 
Cereals 284,736 419,732 402,037 351,364 356,261 375,996 91,260 32.1% 
Rice 155,514 215,751 176,429 208,046 202,708 197,824 42,309 27.2% 
Corn 129,222 203,981 225,608 143,318 153,553 178,172 48,950 37.9% 
Legumes 95,306 150,584 112,712 123,914 123,434 119,775 24,469 25.7% 
Beans 95,306 150,584 112,712 123,914 123,434 119,775 24,469 25.7% 
Tobacco 23,048 24,861 20,256 13,631 16,130 12,906 -10,142 -44.0% 
Citrus Fruits 45,635 47,921 43,149 33,391 26,155 20,290 -25,345 -55.5% 
Oranges 30,628 31,907 26,046 18,988 13,500 11,222 -19,406 -63.4% 
Grapefruit 13,207 12,424 13,075 11,093 9,895 7,605 -5,603 -42.4% 
Lemon 898 1,116 879 836 754 656 -242 -26.9% 
Other Fruits 83,058 91,662 96,890 80,781 79,439 83,472 414 0.5% 
Mangoes 24,972 37,276 30,790 29,531 29,961 30,585 5,613 22.5% 
                
Guava 10,116 13,035 11,660 8,525 8,704 10,093 -23 -0.2% 
                
Papaya 4,406 5,427 7,979 5,800 5,824 6,186 1,781 40.4% 
Cocoa 3,800 5,089 5,114 5,153 4,203 4,303 503 13.2% 
(a)
 Includes Roots and Tubers and Plantains.  
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014). 
As Table 2 indicates, between 2008 and 2013, the areas planted and under production increased 
in five (5) out of the nine (9) categories of non-sugar agricultural crops reported by the National 
Statistics Office as follows: viandas (6.3%), cereals (32.1%), legumes (25.7%), other fruits 
(0.5%), and cocoa (13.2%).  Conversely, during the same period, the areas planted and under 
production declined in the following crop categories: plantains (-17.7%), vegetables (-17.4%), 
tobacco (-44%), and citrus fruits (-55.5%) (Table 2). 
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Table 3. Cuba: Non-sugar agricultural production, selected crops, tons. 
CROPS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Chg. % Chg. 
Viandas(a) 2,150,700 2,236,000 2,250,000 2,280,000 2,337,000 2,239,000 88,300 4.1% 
Roots and tubers 1,392,500 1,565,600 1,515,000 1,445,000 1,452,000 1,580,500 188,000 13.5% 
Potato 196,100 278,600 191,500 165,600 130,933 106,700 -89,400 -45.6% 
Boniato 375,000 437,100 384,743 311,900 335,319 396,347 21,347 5.7% 
                  Malanga 240,000 199,400 137,400 132,100 153,782 185,922 -54,078 -22.5% 
Plantains 758,200 670,400 735,000 835,000 885,000 658,500 -99,700 -13.1% 
Bananas 280,800 245,400 249,200 250,000 195,496 150,336 -130,464 -46.5% 
Plantains 477,400 425,000 485,800 585,000 689,504 508,164 30,764 6.4% 
Vegetables 2,439,300 2,548,800 2,141,035 2,200,000 2,112,000 2,406,500 -32,800 -1.3% 
Tomato 575,900 750,000 517,040 601,000 557,100 678,000 102,100 17.7% 
Onions 128,100 131,300 111,737 143,500 118,244 126,876 -1,224 -1.0% 
Pepper 63,677 56,672 44,545 55,057 62,202 73,336 9,659 15.2% 
Cereals 761,700 868,400 778,863 920,400 1,002,000 1,098,800 337,100 44.3% 
Rice 436,000 563,600 454,400 566,400 641,600 672,600 236,600 54.3% 
Corn 325,700 304,800 324,463 354,000 360,400 426,200 100,500 30.9% 
Legumes 97,200 110,800 80,439 133,000 127,100 129,800 32,600 33.5% 
Beans 97,200 110,800 80,439 133,000 127,100 129,800 32,600 33.5% 
Tobacco 21,500 25,200 20,500 19,900 19,500 24,000 2,500 11.6% 
Citrus Fruits 391,800 418,000 345,000 264,500 203,700 166,900 -224,900 -57.4% 
Oranges 200,400 261,000 178,263 122,900 93,837 85,110 -115,290 -57.5% 
Grapefruit 166,100 121,500 137,660 112,000 84,741 63,979 -102,121 -61.5% 
Lemon 5,400 8,300 6,060 6,600 6,475 5,025 -375 -7.0% 
Other Fruits 738,500 748,000 762,045 817,000 964,900 925,000 186,500 25.3% 
Mangoes 228,700 269,300 203,595 185,000 286,385 285,526 56,826 24.8% 
                Guava 126,500 84,900 71,581 85,000 103,191 124,964 -1,536 -1.2% 
                Papaya 89,400 95,700 135,707 135,000 178,558 197,842 108,442 121.3% 
Cocoa 1,100 1,387 1,709 1,510 2,027 1,425 325 29.5% 
(a)
 Includes Roots and Tubers and Plantains.  
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014). 
Production in six (6) of the nine (9) reported categories of (non-sugar) crops increased as 
follows during the 2008-2013 period: viandas (4.1%), cereals (44.3%), legumes (33.5%), 
tobacco (11.6%), other fruits (25.3%), and cocoa (29.5%). These output levels, however, were 
significantly lower than in 1989, the last year before the onset of the “economic crisis of the 
1990s” and the disintegration of the Socialist Camp and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.  
By contrast, output declined in the following three (3) crop categories during the same period: 
plantains (-13.1%), vegetables (-1.3%), and citrus fruits (-57.4%) (Table 3).  The variability of 
physical output in Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector between 2008 and 2013 was attributed 
to several factors such as adverse weather conditions (e.g. drought, hurricanes), difficulties in 
obtaining essential agricultural inputs, existing limitations with regards to the “realization of 
property” (as discussed earlier), price controls, problems an inefficiencies related to the 
commercialization of agricultural products, insufficient warehousing and storage capacity, 
logistical difficulties associated with the transportation and cold storage of agricultural 
products, soil erosion and degradation, insufficient irrigation capabilities, and other 
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administrative, organizational, and structural problems (Mesa-Lago, 2012; Nova González, 
2013a; Spadoni, 2014). 
 
Agricultural yields for selected (non-sugar) crops during the 2008-2013 period are shown on 
Table 4.  
Table 4. Cuba: Agricultural yields, selected crops, tons per hectare 
CROPS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Viandas
(a)
 7.69 6.34 6.20 7.71 8.59 7.53 
Roots and tubers 7.10 6.36 6.21 7.19 7.61 6.92 
Potato 20.03 22.32 22.09 22.48 20.54 21.59 
Boniato 6.36 5.57 4.82 6.83 7.06 8.21 
                  
Malanga 9.03 7.38 6.94 8.13 10.05 11.34 
Plantains 9.07 6.30 6.17 8.80 10.89 9.57 
Bananas 11.99 7.43 9.18 8.78 10.78 11.02 
Plantains 7.93 5.79 5.28 8.81 10.93 9.21 
Vegetables 9.42 9.15 9.05 10.40 10.41 11.24 
Tomato 9.27 10.84 10.54 10.94 11.37 12.49 
Onions 11.59 11.33 11.44 13.39 12.89 10.92 
Pepper 9.14 7.84 7.68 9.80 9.86 9.37 
Cereals 2.68 2.07 1.94 2.62 2.81 2.92 
Rice 2.80 2.61 2.58 2.72 3.17 3.40 
Corn 2.52 1.49 1.44 2.47 2.35 2.39 
Legumes 1.02 0.74 0.71 1.07 1.03 1.08 
Beans 1.02 0.74 0.71 1.07 1.03 1.08 
Tobacco 0.93 1.01 1.01 1.46 1.21 1.86 
Citrus Fruits 8.59 8.72 8.00 7.92 7.79 8.23 
Oranges 6.54 8.18 6.84 6.47 6.95 7.58 
Grapefruit 12.58 9.78 10.53 10.10 8.56 8.41 
Lemon 6.02 7.44 6.89 7.89 8.59 7.66 
Other Fruits 8.89 8.16 7.87 10.11 12.15 11.08 
Mangoes 9.16 7.22 6.61 6.26 9.56 9.34 
                
Guava 12.51 6.51 6.14 9.97 11.86 12.38 
                
Papaya 20.29 17.63 17.01 23.28 30.66 31.98 
Cocoa 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.48 0.33 
(a)
 Includes Roots and Tubers and Plantains.  
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014). 
Between 2008 and 2013, agricultural yields increased in seven (7) out of the nine (9) crop 
categories shown on Table 4.  These were: plantains, vegetables, cereals, legumes, tobacco, 
other fruits, and cocoa.  However, yields for viandas and citrus fruits decreased slightly during 
the same period. 
4. Towards a New Agricultural Model 
Despite representing only about 5% of GDP, due to its indirect economic contributions, 
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positive externalities (or “spillover effects”), and strong linkages with the rest of the economy, 
agriculture plays a key role in the Cuban economy (Nova González, 2013a).  Cuba’s 
agricultural sector is also an important source of employment, a significant consumer of raw 
materials, intermediate, and finished goods, and one of the country’s principal generators of 
renewable energy (Nova González, 2008).  
Since the onset of the “economic crisis of the 1990s,” following the disappearance of the 
Eastern European Socialist Bloc and the former Soviet Union, Cuban agriculture has been 
affected by declining production levels, higher external sector dependency, and increased hard 
currency expenditures to finance growing agricultural imports (Nova González, 
2013a;González-Corzo & Nova González, 2013).  Starting in 2007, the Cuban government 
has implemented a series of economic transformations to increase domestic agricultural 
production and reduced the country’s dependency on agricultural imports and is food and 
agricultural vulnerability.  These include structural and administrative transformations such as 
the transfers of idle State-owned lands (in usufruct) to non-State producers, moderate price 
reforms, the decentralization of decision-making and administrative functions, the 
consolidation of several Ministries responsible to agricultural policies and regulation, and 
gradual (experimental) transformations with regards to the commercialization of agricultural 
products  (Mesa-Lago, 2012; Spadoni, 2014).  So far, the most significant of these reform 
measures has been the transfer (in usufruct) of fallow State-owned lands to cooperatives and 
private farmers after the approval of Decree-Law 259  in 2008 and Decree-Law 300 in 2012 
(Nova González, 2013a). 
Official Cuba agricultural statistics show that there was mixed results in terms of the area 
planted and under production, and physical output between 2008 and 2013 (Tables 2 and 3).  
While both variables increased in some crop categories during this period, they decreased in 
others, indicating that the policy transformations initiated in 2007 had mixed effects.  A 
simple linear regression conducted by the authors, using 2008-2013 data, to analyze the 
relationship between agricultural production (the dependent variable) and the area planted and 
under production (the independent variable) produced a correlation coefficient  of 0.774 
suggesting  a strong (positive) linear relationship between these two variables.  Our 
regression results also showed a coefficient of correlation (R2) of 0.599, indicating that close to 
60% of the variation of the dependent variable (i.e. agricultural production) around the mean 
can be explained by the variation in independent variable (i.e. the area planted and under 
production).  We believe that one of the key takeaways from these findings, which were 
statistically-significant at the 5% level, is that one of the palpable effects of Cuba’s recent 
agricultural transformations seems to be the reallocation of land to the production of selected 
crop categories, as the country advances towards a new agricultural model. 
Cuba’s agricultural sector is comprised of State and non-State producers.  The latter category 
includes the UBPCs, CPA, CCS, and private farmers.  Under Cuba’s new agricultural model, 
non-State producers account for a growing share of the country’s agricultural output.  While 
CCS and private farmers hold about 36% of the country’s agricultural surface (or arable land), 
the produce close to 60% of its total agricultural output.  According to Nova González (2013a), 
these non-State producers account for 56% of total cow milk production, compared to just 15% 
in the case of the State sector.  Combined, the CCS and private farmers own more than 50% of 
the total cattle herd and 56% of the milk-producing cattle, and 59% of the total pork live stock 
in Cuba (Nova González, 2013a).  
The importance of the non-State sector in Cuban agriculture has also grown in terms of its 
share of total employment, and overall contributions to and participation in the Cuban 
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economy (Nova González, 2013a; Spadoni, 2014). Approximately 20% of Cuba’s economy is 
directly or indirectly related to agriculture; an estimated 80% of the economically-active 
population is directly or indirectly involved in economic activities related to agriculture; and 
several key sectors of the economy, such as food processing, light industry, and transportation 
are strongly-connected to the agricultural sector (Nova González, 2013a). 
There are three (3) fundamental unresolved aspects that need to be addressed, which have 
significantly limited the impact of the agricultural transformations initiated in 2007.  These 
are: (1) the need to achieve the complete (or full) “realization of property,”  (2) the necessity to 
recognize and accept the existence of the market and its complementary role in the 
coordination of economic activities, and (3) the absence of a systematic approach across the 
entire agricultural production-consumption cycle to strengthen micro and macroeconomic 
linkages (Nova González, 2013a). 
These unresolved aspects should be addressed or resolved through the gradual implementation 
of policies that facilitate the consolidation of input markets, where agricultural producers can 
obtain or procure essential inputs at prices that correspond to the prices they can receive for 
their output.  Policies that allow agricultural producers to determine output levels and the final 
destination of their output, in accordance to market conditions and social requirements, should 
also be implemented.  The diversification of the forms of agricultural commercialization, as 
an alternative to monopolistic or oligopolistic forms, should also be considered.  This can be 
accomplished through the creation of “second degree cooperatives,” created through the 
voluntary association of a group of production cooperatives to commercialize agricultural 
products on their behalf, and through the authorization of direct sales by such cooperatives to 
agricultural markets, the food processing industry, tourism enterprises, exporters, and other 
entities in the Cuban economy. The diversification of the existing forms of agricultural 
commercialization can also be achieved through the increased participation of private farmers, 
the expansion of retail “points of sale,” and the inclusion of participants to include 
commercialization cooperatives and enterprises, individual producers (or private farmers), and 
the State procurement agency, Acopio.    
Another step, or policy measure, to address the unresolved aspects that affect Cuban 
agriculture, is the transformation of labor (or employment) relations to allow producers to 
freely hire the amount of labor required to maintain and increase output. This requires, of 
course, greater levels of producer autonomy when it comes to hiring one of the most essential 
inputs in Cuban agriculture: labor. Finally, agricultural producers should be provided with the 
financing necessary to support their operations, and periodic technical assistance to improve 
their results and outcomes.  The forms of financing provided to agricultural producers should 
include short-term and long-term micro-loans, equipment loans, input financing loans, crop 
revenue anticipation loans, and personal home improvement and construction, and farm 
improvement loans, (Coffrey, 1998; Morvant-Roux, 2008).  Technical assistance to help 
no-State agricultural producers improve their results and outcomes should include some varied 
forms of government extension programs, value chain development programs, certification 
programs, agribusiness support programs, financial services and advisory support programs, 
and programs to support enabling institutions (The Initiative for Smallholder Finance, 2014). 
The implementation of these policy measures will facilitate the “realization of property,” under 
which agricultural producers would enjoy greater levels of administrative and operational 
autonomy and with respect to their production decisions and outcomes.  Their implementation 
would also allow for the utilization of the market as a complementary, but regulated, economic 
coordination mechanism to achieve more rational levels of resource utilization, and higher 
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levels of economic efficiency.  Such process would favor the successful completion of the 
agricultural production cycle, under a systematic focus. 
Given its long and successful participation in important clusters of non-sugar agriculture in 
Cuba, it is not surprising to find that under Cuba’s new agricultural model non-State producers 
are allowed to play a larger role in the recovery and revival of this important sector of the 
economy. However, the expansion of the non-State sector should be conducted in gradual and 
regulated manner, particularly with regards to labor practices, the accumulation and transfer of 
assets, and health and safety standards. In this context, a strong but not antagonistic State, with 
the capacity to adapt and innovate, particularly on the regulatory front, but not completely 
malleable by the brutal forces of market capitalism, could play a vital role to ensure and 
promote agricultural self-sufficiency and national food security in Cuba.  
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